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4Terminology
Term Explanation
API Application programming interface
Compiler Software that translates human readable code to lower 
level language which computers can understand
HTTP HyperText Transport Protocol
Java Programming language introduced by Sun 
Microsystems
Java EE Java Enterprise Edition
Java SE Java Standard Edition
JAXB Java Architecture for XML Binding
JNDI Java Naming and Directory Interface
JPQL Java Persistence Query Language
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project
POJO Plain Old Java Object
REST Representational State Transfer
RMI-IIOP Remote Method Invocation (RMI) interface over the 
Internet Inter-Orb protocol (IIOP)
SAST Static Application Security Testing
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SQL sequal query language used in databases
WS-I Web Service interoperability organization
WSDL Web Service Description Language which is used to 
describe web service interfaces to clients
51 Introduction
This master's thesis researches how Java EE application security can be 
improved by using static application security testing tools. For that it first 
presents what security elements Java programming language has and what 
extra security elements and techniques Java Enterprise edition offers. 
After presenting what is considered as security elements in Java EE 
applications master's thesis introduces what a Static Application Testing is and
how the static application testing tools work in the technical perspective. From 
here the master's thesis moves towards to static application security testing 
and tries to explain what static application security testing is. In the end of this 
part is small preview to the common used static application analysis tools.
Last part of background information of this master's thesis defines how 
applications security is measured. So it is possible to define if static 
application security analysis help to build better software. 
1.1 Reasearch methods
The master's thesis applies Static Application Security Testing to a Java EE 
application and analyses the results. Analysis tries to resolve how well Java 
EE security models and mechanisms are covered by the chosen tool set and if
they provide useful information for developers. In the master's thesis research 
background chapter relevant Java EE technologies are studied and charted 
for possible points that developers could misuse thus exposing the application
to security weaknesses. Empirical research is based on the following research
questions.
1. How does static application security testing improve Java EE 
6applications security?
2. Which elements forms Java EE applications security?
3. How does SonarQube work?
1.2 Research limitations
This master's thesis does not study application development processes which 
uses static application security testing nor does it not contain how to apply 
static application security testing results to application development. Java SE 
security models and mechanisms are also left outside of this master's thesis 
with possible weaknesses that are caused by misusing the Java language 
itself. In the static application security part SonarSource's SonarQube product 
is used to produce analysis data, this limitation is based on the assigner's 
needs.
The master's thesis does not express any opinions to design patters that could
increase or decrease application security. Additionally, Java EE technologies 
are limited to those technologies that master's thesis assigner uses and are 
presented through chapters 2.1.1.1 to 2.1.1.15.
1.3 Assigner
The assigner of the master's thesis is Kela, the Social Insurance Institute of 
Finland that operates directly under the supervision of Finnish parliament. 
Kela's mission is to secure the income and promote the health of the entire 
nation, and to support the capacity of individual citizens to care for 
themselves. Kela is a reliable, efficient and socially responsible actor. It has an
active role in developing social security and its implementation. The social 
security provided by Kela is clearly understandable, reasonable in amount and
7delivered with a good standard of quality. Kela's service is the best in the 
public sector. (Operations 2014.)
Kela has its own ICT department, that employees about 500 persons and it 
develops all its own benefit systems used to make a benefit decision. About 
100 persons from all of Kela  ICT department staff are Java developers. There
is currently an on-going project called ARKKI, that aims to renew all the 
benefit systems from the mainframe to Java EE.
82 Research background
This chapter presents all background knowledge for this master's thesis. The 
first subchapter explains what Java EE  and its security aspects are and how 
Java EE technologies are used. After that static application testing is 
introduced and SonarSource's SonarQube tool. The end of this chapter 
explains how applications security can be measured and which are the factors
are affecting application's security in code level.
2.1 Java EE
Java EE means basically Java's Enterprise Edition (Java EE) which uses Java
Standard Edition (Java SE) specification as its base. Java EE contains two 
sections, Java EE platform specification and a set of specifications for 
technologies. 
Java community (ldemichiel 2014) writes that the Java EE Platform 
specification is an umbrella specification that does not directly define Java EE 
APIs. The Java EE platform specification only references to other 
specifications and defines how they work together. Java community continues 
to tell that beside being an umbrella specification Java EE platform 
specification defines other attributes of the platform such as security, 
deployment, transactions and interoperability. 
As earlier mentioned The Java EE platform specification only refers to the 
Java APIs specification and Java EE contains totally 33 different specification, 
including platform specification. From these 33 specifications 24 specify purely
technologies and APIs such as JAVA API for RESTful web services (JAX-RS) 
2.0. The rest of the specifications does not directly define technologies but 
defines how something should be implemented from architectural point of 
view, how to use a specific pattern, or container behaviour. These nine 
9specifications are listed in the following list. The technology specifications are 
presented in chapter 2.1.2.
• JSR 45: Debugging support for other languages
• JSR 52: Standard Tag Library for JavaServer Pages (JSTL) 1.2
• JSR 77: J2EE Management 1.1
• JSR 88: Java EE application deployment
• JSR 109: Implementing Enterprise Web Services 1.3
• JSR 115: Java Authorization Contract for Containers
• JSR 181: Web Service Metadata for the java Platform
• JSR 322: Java EE connector Architecture 1.7
• JSR 342: Java Platform, Enterprise Edition 7
All these different technologies run on top of Java SE and communicate to 
each other through containers. As Völter, Schmid and Wolff (2002, 44.) 
explains that containers are an execution environment that provides a 
federated view to the underlying Java EE API's for the application 
components. Figure 1 shows how Java EE containers communicate together.
2.1.1 Java EE containers
There are three different containers in Java EE:  Application client container, 
Web container and EJB container.  All these containers have their own 
purpose and supports a set of APIs as well as offer services like security, 
database access, transaction handling, naming directory, resource injection to 
components (Goncalves 2013, 3). The software does not need to utilize all 
these containers only those which it really needs. For example pure back-end 
that does not provide any graphical user interface needs only EJB container.
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Application client container can be used to bring dependency injection, 
security management and naming service to Java SE software. The 
application client container uses RMI-IIOP to communicate with EJB container
and HTTP to communicate with Web container. (Goncalves 2013, 3). Figure 2 
shows what APIs the application client container contains.
Figure 1:  Java EE Containers (Jendrock; Cervera-navarro; Evans; 
Haase; Markito N.D. 1-12)
Figure 2: Java EE APIs in Application Client 
Container (Jendrock, Cervera-navarro, Evans, 
Haase & Markito N.D,1-15)
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Web container is used to produce web pages that are based on technologies 
like servlets, JSPs, filters, listeners, JSF and web services. The web container 
instantiates, initializes and invokes servlet and filters. It also supports HTTP 
and HTTPS protocols that are used to communicate with web browsers.  
(Goncalves 2013, 3). Figure 3 shows what APIs the Web Container contains.
EJB container is used in back-end components that contains Java EE 
application's business logic. EJB container is responsible for managing the 
execution of the Enterprise Java Bean (EJB). This container provide services 
like transactions, security, concurrency, distribution, naming services, or 
possibility to be invoked asynchronously. (Goncalves 2013, 3). Figure 4 shows
what APIs the EJB Container contains.
Figure 3: Java EE APIs in Web Container (Jendrock; Cervera-
navarro; Evans; Haase; Markito N.D,. 1-13)
12
2.1.2 Technologies and their security perspectives
This chapter introduces different Java EE technologies, theirs common use 
cases and security mechanisms. The focus in introductions is on those 
technologies that are designed for developers to use and those which involve 
security heavily.
2.1.2.1JSR-224 Java API for XML-Based Web Services (JAX-WS) 
2.2 
JAX-WS specification is a follow-up to JAX-RCP by extending it using JAXB 
XML mapping rules instead of defining their own mapping rules, adding 
support for SOAP 1.2, WSDL 2.0 and WS-I Basic Profile 1.1, adding better 
metadata annotation support and aligning with, complementing the security 
API defined by JSR-183 and describing techniques and mechanisms for 
versioning services. Other updates that JAX-WS brings are improvements fo 
document/message centric usage, which is listed as follow. (Kotamraju 2011, 
1-2.)
Figure 4: Java EE APIs in EJB Container (Jendrock; Cervera-
navarro; Evans; Haase; Markito N.D, 1-14)
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• Supports client side asynchronous operations
• Improve separating XML message format and transport mechanism
• Simplifies clients and services access to the message
• Supports message based session management
JAX-WS client is implemented by using javax.xml.ws.Service class and 
javax.xml.ws.Dispatch and javax.xml.ws.BindingProvider interfaces. Service 
class represents WSDL service. The actual service instance can be acquired 
dynamically through Service.create method or statically by implementing its 
own class that extends Service class. Both ways need service an endpoint 
address and a Java type that represents the service. BindingProvider interface
provides protocol bindings to client and methods to manipulate binding 
provider's context. Mandatory binding provider context properties that can be 
manipulated are presented in Table 1. The Dispatch interface gives developer 
access to XML message level. The XML message can be accessed in 
message payload or message mode, where message payload gives access to
the data sent and in message mode to the protocol specific message 
structure.(Katomraju 2011, 55 - 68)
Table 1:  Mandatory binding provider context properties
Property Description
javax.xml.ws.endpoint.address Enpoints address
javax.xml.ws.security.auth.username User name for HTTP basic authentication
javax.xml.ws.security.auth.password Password for HTTP basic authentication
javax.xml.ws.session.maintain Indicates whether client is prepared to 
participate in services session
To implement a service, the endpoint specification offers an API that contains 
total of four interface and class in package javax.xml.ws. The endpoint service
low level implementation can be accomplished by implementing the class that 
implements Provider interface. The provider interface is the counterpart for 
clients Dispatch interface and can also operate in two modes Payload and 
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Message. When using Payload mode the provider must be typed to implement
Provider<Source> and in Message mode Provider<Message>. The mode is 
defined by using type level annotation called @ServiceMode. Higher level 
services are implemented as normal Java classes and interfaces where 
implementing class is annotated with @WebService annotation that defines 
port name, service name, target namespace and endpoint interface. The 
interface can be annotated with @WebService annotation that defines the 
service's namespace. The implemented service is published by Endpoint 
class. Endpoint instance is first acquired with create method which takes 
service implementation class's instance as parameter. After that service is 
published with the endpoint's publish method. (Katomraju 2011, 71-81.)
The other two parts are WebServiceContext interface and 
W3EndpointReferenceBuilder class. WebServiceContext interface is a shared 
context for all objects that involves handling invocation of the web service. If 
WebServiceContext methods are invoked out side of web service methods, 
the invocation implementation should throw java.lang.IllegalStateException. 
The WebServiceContext is thread safe and uses thread-locals to identify 
correct information between different requests. W3EndpointReferenceBuilder 
can be used to create Endpoint reference to another web service endpoint. 
(Katomraju 2011, 81 - 84.)
JSR-224 simplifies developing web services to a developer. There is still two 
possible points where mistakes can be made. The first one is in client side, 
where it is possible to use BindingProvider to hard code basic authentication 
username and password. The other one relates to XML namespaces which 
should be defined to web services but @WebService annotation does not 
require namespace. The missing namespace can cause conflict in service 
calls if two or more services have the same name and same endpoint 
address.
2.1.2.2JSR-236 Concurrency Utilities for Java EE 1.0 
JSR-236 offers concurrency API to developer to use in his or her application. It
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extends Java SE's concurrency API so that Java EE containers can manage 
threads that are created in application. If Java SE's concurrency API is used in
Java EE environment it can cause weird race conditions because the 
container is not aware of these threads and that they are accessing shared 
resources like data source.(Concurrency Utilities for Java EE 2013, 2-1 - 2-2).
As Vidergar states in his white paper incorrectly coded concurrency handling 
can cause race condition, deadlock or denial of service through poor 
performance or scalability. He continues that concurrency mistakes are hard 
to notice in testing phase and they might rise only in certain situations like 
under heavy load. (Vidergar, Stender 2008, 2). 
2.1.2.3JSR-250 Common Annotations for the Java Platform 1.2 
The JSR-250 specification defines set of annotation that are used in other 
specifications and how they are handled in case of inheritance. The 
specification defines fourteen different annotations that are explained in Table 
2.
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Table 2: Common annotations
Annotations name Annotations description
javax.annotation.Generated Indicates that code is genered by defined generator. 
Can also imply date of generation.
javax.annotation.Resource Declares resource reference. Resources name, type,
authentication type, jndi lookup name, shareable and
mapped name can be defined by this annotation.
javax.annotation.Resources Permit to define multiple javax.annotation.Resource 
annotations to class, method or field.
javax.annotation.PostConstruct Defines method that can be used to initialize the 
object after injections
javax.annotation.PreDestroy Defines method that will be invoked before container 
removes the bean. Can be used, for example, to 
clean resources properly before removing the bean.
javax.annotation.Priority Indicates order of the classes been used.
javax.annotation.security.RunAs Defines role that is used to run application. Role 
must be mapped to user or group of security realm.
javax.annotation.security.
RolesAllowed
Defines roles that are permitted to invoke methods in
class. Can be used in class or method level. 
javax.annotation.PermitAll Allows all security roles to invoke methods of class. 
Can be used in class or method level.
javax.annotation.DenyAll Denies all security roles to invoke methods of class. 
Can be used in class or method level.
javax.annotation.security.
DeclareRoles
Declares security roles that are used in the 
application. Can be used only in class level.
javax.annotation.sql.
DataSourceDefinition
Defines containers datasource and to registering it 
by JNDI. This annotation permits to define 
datasource type (driver class), URL, username, 
password, database name, port number, server 
name, isolation level, connection transaction 
capabilities, pool size properties, idle time, maximum
statement count, login timeout and vendor specific 
properties.
javax.annotation.sql.
DataSourceDefinitions
Permit to define multiple 
javax.annotation.sql.DataSourceDefinition 
annotations to class.
javax.annotation.ManagedBean Defines object to be container managed. Can be 
used only in class level.
This master's thesis is only interested in RunAs, RolesAllowed, PermitAll, 
DenyAll, DeclaredRoles and DataSourceDefinition annotations. The most 
interesting common annotation is DataSourceDefinition because it allows 
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definition of username and password. As the JSR-250 specification states 
defining password is not recommended at least in production code (Mordani 
2013, 2-26).
2.1.2.4JSR-318 Interceptors 1.2 
The JSR-318 defines interceptor mechanism that can be used to interpose on 
business method invocation or specific event. There for the interceptors can 
be divided into two different categories: business method interceptors and 
interceptors for life-cycle event callbacks. All business method interceptors 
implements method with @AroundInvoke annotation that is able to execute 
code before and after the actual method invocation. Life cycle event callback 
interceptor implements a method or methods annotated with 
@AroundContructor, @PostConstruct, @PreDestroy or @AroundTimeout 
annotations. The following list presents what can be done with each of these 
annotations. (Vatkina 2013a, 11.)
• @AroundContructor annotated methods can execute code before and 
after invocation of constructor
• @PostConstuct annotated methods can execute code after bean's 
injection is done
• @PreDestroy annotated methods can execute code on an event when 
container is going to remove the bean
• @AroundTimeout annotated methods will be executed by Timer 
service. Annotation can define calendar-based schedule, specific time, 
specific amount of time elapsed or specific interval that fires 
interceptors event.
JSR-381 does not specify anything security related, although interceptor 
mechanisms can be used to improve application's security. For example there 
could be an interceptor in a public web service interface that handles all 
technical exceptions and throws user friendly exception to caller or one that 
logs all incoming requests; however these are application specific custom 
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implementations, and therefore they are not within of this master's thesis.
2.1.2.5JSR- 338 Java Persistence API 2.1 
JSR-338 defines API for managing persistence and mapping relation 
database to Java objects (DeMichiel 2013, 21). As the specification defines 
both mappings database to java classes and query language to manage 
database, these should be handled separately.
JSR-338 defines a large set of annotations which can be used to as metadata 
that represents database definitions. These annotations are applied to classes
that represent database structure and are annotated with @Entity annotation. 
Each field or property that represent a column in a database is annotated with 
corresponding metadata annotation in entity class, for example, a primary key 
field is annotated with @Id annotation or a one-to-one relationship is marked 
with @OneToOne annotation. These annotations are highly tight to database 
design and application's needs from the database and the way they are used 
varies from case to case.   
The query language part is more interesting in the perspective of this master's 
thesis because SQL injections are conducted by querying or updating a 
database. By using Java Percistence API queries can be executed by using 
two different techniques NamedQueries and CriteriaQueries. NamedQueries 
are static expression and they can be defined by using Java Persistence 
Query Language (JPQL) or using native SQL (DeMichiel 2013, 151-152). 
Criteria API queries are defined by using object-based query definition objects 
(DeMichiel 2013, 235). Following code snippets shows the usage of 
NamedQueries and Criteria API queries.
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public Person getPersonNamedQuery(String name) {
Query personQuery = this.entityManager.
     createNamedQuery("SELECT P FROM Person P WHERE 
p.name = :name", Person.class);
personQuery.setParameter("name", name);
return (Person)personQuery.getSingleResult();
        }
public Person getPersonCriteriaAPI(String name) {
    CriteriaBuilder builder = this.entityManager
      .getCriteriaBuilder();
 CriteriaQuery<Person> query =
builder.createQuery(Person.class);
ParameterExpression<Integer> parameter =
builder.parameter(Integer.class);
Root<Person> person = query.from(Person.class);
query.select(person).where(builder.equal(person.get("name"), 
name));
return entityManager.createQuery(query)
.getSingleResult();
        }
Gnanasundar expresses in his blog post that JPQL and native queries have 
an injection weakness if not used correctly (Gnanasundar N.D). This is 
because neither way cannot detect if query itself is parsed or not and the 
parsed parameter can have harmful characters that are not escaped. The 
setParameter method will escape harmful characters, and injections are not 
possible. For the sake of clarity the following code snippets shows an example
of this. 
public Person getPersonNamedQueryUsingParsing(String name) {
    String queryString = 
"SELECT P FROM Person P WHERE p.name=" + name;
    Query personQuery = this.entityManager 
.createQuery(queryString, Person.class);
    return (Person)personQuery.getSingleResult();
}
2.1.2.6JSR-339 Java API for ReSTful Web Services (JAX-RS) 
2.0
JSR 339 defines how to implement Representational State Transfer (REST) 
Web services and their clients with Java. Components for implementing a 
REST are resources, providers, filters, interceptors and validation. 
Resources are the main part of REST services because they are entry points 
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to the service. Resources are defined by using @Path annotation. Resource 
class can have properties or fields that are annotated with @MatrixParam, 
@QueryParam, @PathParam, @CookieParam, @HeaderParam or 
@Context. Values for these properties or fields are extracted from the 
corresponding part of the request. These annotations are supported only for 
resources that use per-request life cycle. 
Resource methods present methods in resource class with @GET, @POST, 
@PUT, @DELETE, @HEAD or @OPTIONS annotation on them. These 
annotations represent the HTTP method used to access the resource. 
Resource methods can return Void, Response or GenericEntity which each 
are mapped to 200 or 204 HTTP return code to indicate that all went fine. 
Resource methods also can have @Path annotation to specify an additional 
ULR or a parameter that has to be present to invoke the resource method. 
@Path annotation takes String as its value that presents URL's part or 
placeholder for the parameter's name. As following code snippet shows, 
deletePerson method is invoked from URL http://localhost/persons/9 when 
DELETE HTTP method is used.
@Path("persons")
public class PersonService {
@DELETE
@Path("{id}")
public Response deletePerson(@PathParam(”id”) 
String id) {
...
return response;
}
}
Method could even define in the @Path annotation that id-parameter must 
match the regular expression which would be defined as @Path(“{path:
([ABC])”) and which would match only those requests that have only A, B or C 
character in the id part. (Pericas-Geertsen & Potociar 2013, 13-16.)
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JAX-RS implementation can be extended in run-time by using providers. 
Providers provide MessageBodyReader and MessageBodyWriter 
implementations that are responsible for converting messages to Java objects
and Java objects to messages. Providers themselves are not prone to security
weaknesses as a technology is, but if MessageBodyWriter or 
MessageBodyReader are badly implemented they can cause side effects that 
cannot be predicted. (Pericas-Geertsen & Potociar 2013, 27- 30.)
Providers, on the other hand,  offer a way to extend JAX-RS to support 
different type of messages interceptors and filters, and enables developer to 
add different capabilities to JAX-RC service, like logging, authentication, 
confidentiality, entity compression etc. Interceptors wrap method invocation 
and can execute code around invocation as filters execute code at the 
extension point; however they do not wrap method invocation. Filters offer four
extension points for the response and the request at client and at server end. 
These are invoked when a request leaves from client or when it is received by 
server and when a response is sent from server and received by client. 
(Pericas-Geertsen & Potociar 2013, 37- 40.)
JAX-RS relies on the JSR 349 bean validation specification which is 
introduced later in this chapter. 
In perspective of this master's thesis, the interesting parts of the specification 
are resources with JAX-RS annotated properties, non-public methods with 
@Path annotation and validation. JAX-RS annotated resource properties 
should not be written in any other life cycle phase than creation because that 
can cause errors in concurrency. Non-public methods with @Path annotation 
cannot be accessed outside of application and therefore are unnecessary. The
regular expression capabilities of @Path annotations are also interesting 
because by using them it is possible to white list valid paths.
2.1.2.7JSR-340 Java Servlet 3.1 
JSR-340 is used to produce dynamic content in web applications. Servlets use
by default HTTP and optionally HTTPS protocols to communicate with clients, 
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for example web browsers, and all JSR-340 containers must support at least 
HTTP protocol. HttpServlet subclass adds dedicated methods for all HTTP 
methods that call automatically GenericServlets service method. The servlets 
are initialized through init-method of the Servlet interface, therefore 
developers should not do any container related operation in class construction
methods because the servlet might not be yet active in the container. The 
servlet container can handle concurrent requests; however the developer can 
alternate this behaviour by implementing SingleThreadModel interface which 
forces the container to serialize requests or to maintaining pool of servlet 
instances. Another way to achieve this is to mark the service method as 
synchronized; however this could have a huge performance impact. As the 
servlets support concurrency it is important that the developer is aware that 
Request and Response classes methods are not thread safe, except 
startAsync and complete methods. If other methods are called by multiple 
thread the container can not ensure that results are correct from the caller's  
point of view. (Wai Chang & Mordani 2013, 2-5 - 2-21.)
When using HTTP or HTTPS protocol the servlets support cookies by 
HttpServletRequest class getCookies method. Also, HttpOnly cookies are 
supported that indicated that cookies cannot be read on client side by scripts.  
When HTTPS protocol is used with the servlet, container expose cipher suite 
bit size of the algorithm and SSL session id to developer to use. And if the 
request includes SSL certificate it is also exposed to the developer. The 
Servlet API also allows controlling timeout time of the sessions. If the timeout 
is set to zero it will be handled as infinite timeout. (Wai Chang & Mordani 
2013. 3-29 - 3-30.) 
Static resources can be accessed from the servlet by using getResource or 
getResourceAsSteam methods. These methods load resource relative to root 
of context or relative to META-INF/resources from jars that are in WEB-INF/lib 
folder. These methods should not be used to obtain dynamic resources 
because they will not be processed. (Wai Chang & Mordani 2013. 4-41.)
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The Response class has sendRedirect method which can be used to redirect 
client to a different URL. The method's parameter should be the absolute path 
of the new address. Response class has also sendError method which should 
be used to send an error message to a client with appropriate headers and 
body content.(Wai Chang & Mordani 2013, 5-48.)
2.1.2.8JSR-341 Expression Language 3.0 
JSR 341 specifies simple language that is syntax restricted to the evaluation 
expressions which can be used to access underlying Java object's values and 
methods for example from the presentation layer. Expression language uses $
{} and #{} expression to imply expressions which are evaluated in run-time. 
(Chung 2013, 2-3.)
As expression language only allows developers to access the underlying Java
objects it will itself not present any possible ways for the developer to misuse 
it, and because of that, it will not expose any security weaknesses to 
developer and will not be discussed within the scope of this master's thesis.
2.1.2.9JSR-343 Java Message Service API 2.0 
JSR-343 specifies standard Java API and architectural solution for enterprise 
messaging products which are used in a company's internal network. 
Enterprise messaging systems can include non-java products, which may be 
communicated with this API. JSR-343 defines two types of communication, 
point-to-point and publish and subscribe. In point to point communication the 
client will send a message straight to another client by using an abstract 
queue, and in the publish and subscribe solution the client sends messages to
topic, and clients that want receive messages will subscribe to the same topic.
(Deakin 2013, 12 -13.)
The specification states that it will not include any security API for controlling 
the privacy and integrity of the messages. An as using the new 2.0 API is not 
error prone because it only includes some interfaces and their methods. For 
these reasons, JSR-343 will be left out of this master's thesis.
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2.1.2.10 JSR-344 JavaServer Faces 2.2 
JSR-344 specifies user interface framework for Java web applications. The 
JSF framework is based on JavaServer Pages, Expression language 3.0, 
Servlets, JavaBean and JavaServer Pages Standard Taglibary. JSF provides 
easy-of-use reusable components for building a user interface. Framework 
also allows developer to develop their own reusable components.  It also 
simplifies data migration to and from the user interface and offers a simple 
model for wiring user interface events to server side code (Burns 2013, 44 & 
47.)
When building user interface with JavaServer Faces the view layer is 
developed by using components representing different UI elements that create
tree of components. All components have common ancestor 
javax.faces.component.UIComponent and have unique identifier in context of 
Naming Container. All components in the view can be accessed through 
component tree by their unique identifier. Components are transformed to 
HTML output stream by javax.faces.render.Renderer implementations that are
assigned to the component. The value of the component is bound to it by 
using expression languages value expressions, which will wire up the value in 
the page to the corresponding Java Bean variable. The bound value is 
converted from java.lang.String to appropriate by 
javax.faces.convert.Converter assigned to the component. The component 
can have javax.faces.validator.Validator implementation that is responsible for 
validating the given data. The expression language can also be used to 
method expression which presents the method calls to the corresponding 
object's public methods. (Burns 2013, 85 - 96, 165-166.)
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JSR-344 defines execute and render life cycle for handling incoming requests.
The life cycle consist of six different phases which all have their own 
responsibilities for handling requests. The life cycle handles one view and all 
its components at the time. The life cycle takes care of component's states in 
any given moment. As Figure 5 shows the view is first restored,  then values 
are processed by converters and validator, and updated to model and last 
before sending the response the application itself is invoked.(Burns 2013, 56-
60).
As JavaServer Faces technology is used to implement web applications all 
common web applications are present in it. Open Web Application Security 
Projects has a top ten list of most common web application security risks that 
have to be acknowledged when developing user interfaces with JavaServer 
Faces. It is also possible to developers to misuse the framework and access 
the component's raw value through component tree and use an invalidated 
value.
Figure 5: JSF execute and render lifecycle (see org. Burns 
2013, 55)
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2.1.2.11 JSR-345 Enterprise JavaBean 3.2 
Enterprise JavaBeans aim to be standard component architecture for building 
object-oriented Java EE applications. They simplify application's development 
by hiding low-level transaction and state management details, multi-threading,
connection pooling and other complex low-level APIs. (Vatkina 2013b, 26.) 
JSR-345 defines three types of enterprise beans; session objects, message-
driven objects and entity objects which are optional. Session beans are 
executed on behalf of the client, they can be transaction-aware and update 
shared data but does not represent the data itself. Message-driven objects 
have the same characteristics as session beans ; however they are always 
asynchronously invoked and are stateless. Entity objects represents the data 
and are long lived. (Vatkina 2013b, 32-33.)
Session objects have three subtypes; stateful, stateless and singleton session
beans. The main difference with these subtypes is how beans are presented 
for clients. Stateful session bean instances are always client specific, once the
client acquires references to the bean. The client can invoke bean's business 
methods multiple times and it will always get the same instance of the bean. 
The instance is destroyed after the client invokes @Remove annotated 
method or if the instance is passivated specified amount of time. The EJB 
container passivate an instance when the container implementation specific 
caching algorithm decides so, generally it should be done at the end of each 
method although the instance cannot be passivated within transaction. 
Stateful session bean can store the state of the client but the state is lost if the
instance is destroyed. Invoking destroyed stateful bean will throw 
javax.ejb.NoSuchEJBException. Stateless session beans otherwise are not 
client specific and the client can be sure that it does get the same instance 
reference when invoking a bean multiple times. Container will create and 
destroy stateless session bean instances on demand of active clients; 
therefore a client's state cannot be stored in stateless session beans. 
Singleton session bean instances are shared among all clients. There can be 
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only one instance of a singleton session bean per JVM. As singleton session 
bean instance is shared, it should not store client specific state. (Vatkina 
2013b, 83 - 85, 92 - 94, 98-99.)
JSR-345 have some points where a developer can make a mistake and cause
security weaknesses. If the developer stores client's state to a stateless 
session bean it could be exposed to a different client. This could be hard to 
find in run-time because the client that sets the state could get the same 
instance back in the next invocation or the bean's instance could be destroyed
before any other clients acquire it. Also, the developer could store a client's 
state to singleton session bean, and the state would be shared among all 
clients. Depending on business case this could be a wanted behaviour; 
however developers should still pay attention to this. This is much easier to 
find out than a case with stateless session beans because this happens 
during every invocation.
2.1.2.12 JSR-346 Context and Dependency Injection for Java 
1.1 
JSR-346 specification aims to provide a set of services that can help to 
improve the application's structure. The specified services are following:
• Life cycle for stateful objects that are bound to life cycle 
contexts.
• Type-safe dependency injection mechanism that can select 
dependencies either on development or deployment time. 
• Integration to JSR-341
• Way to decorate injected objects
• Way to associate interceptors with injected objects
• Event notification model
• Addition to servlet specifications contexts, conversational 
context 
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• Portable extensions to integrate with the container
JSR-345 is not meant to be used alone but along with other specifications 
such as JSR-318, JSR-330, JSR-344, JSR-345 or JSR-349. (Muir, 2013, 1-3.)
As JSR-345 shows through examples, the only thing that is left to the 
application developer, in perspective of JSR-345, is adding annotations to 
code and if needed implementing marker annotations. All the other things are 
done under the hood by containers and other specifications, and as 
configuration is evaluated in development or deployment time, it is highly 
unlike that any error could be slipped to production. Specification even states 
that all definition errors are developer errors and are cached in container's 
initialization time. The last point for the discovery of definition errors is 
application's startup, as JSR-345 specifies that containers must perform bean 
discovery and raise definition an exception if any definition errors exists. (Muir 
2013, 4-10, 111-112.) 
Therefore, this specification will itself not cause possible security weaknesses 
that a developer can implement, thus it is not interesting from the point of view
of this master's thesis.
2.1.2.13 JSR-349 Bean Validation 1.1 
JSR-349 defines validation mechanism and object level constraint 
declarations for Java. Constraints are defined by using annotations that have 
been marked with @Constraint annotation. Constrains can be applied to 
types, fields, methods, constructors, parameters or other constraints if 
composition is needed. Constrains define a valid value of the target or multiple
Java types if used to cross-parameter validation. ConstraintValidators are 
used to implement the constraint's validation logic. The validation framework 
automatically invokes ConstraintValidators for the correct constraints and 
validates the given value. If constraint annotation is used for unsupported type
UnexpectedTypeException will be thrown. If the constrains definition is not 
valid ConstraintDefinitionException will be thrown in run-time. (Bernard 2013, 
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5-9.)
The life cycle of constraint validation object is not defined and validation 
providers can cache these instances for future use. Although initialize -method
is invoked before using the implementation, the value should not be stored 
into instances state. (Bernard 2013, 25.)
JSR-349 have some points of failure that can cause unwanted behaviour in 
application's run-time. Developers should be able to get a warning if 
constraint's definition is not valid or constraint is applied to unsupported type, 
or the validated object's value is stored to constraint validator's state.
2.1.2.14 JSR-352 Batch Application for the Java Platform 
JSR-352 specification defines Java API for applications that are intended for 
bulk processing and usually are long running and computing or date intensive.
Batch application can be divided into seven components; JobRepository, 
JobOperator, Job, Step, ItemReader, ItemProcessor and ItemWriter as shows.
JSR-352 can execute a batch sequentially or parallel. (vignola 2013, 5)
The job is specified by using Job Specification Language (JSL) which JSR-
352 defines. JSL is implemented by using XML and has its own XML element 
for Job and step components and their attributes. (Vignola 2013, 19.)
The batch API or the JSL does not expose any possible security themselves 
as APIs are simple and JST is used to control these APIs. Security 
Figure 6: Batch Applications components (See org. Vignola 2013, 5)
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weaknesses in batch applications are caused by misuse of other technologies 
used to implement batch application's functionality. Therefore, this 
specification is not within scope of this master's thesis.
2.1.2.15 JSR-907 Java Transaction API (JTA) 1.2 
JSR-907 specifies interfaces between transaction manager and the 
application, resource managers and application servers. The interface for 
application's is a high level interface that can be used to define the 
application's transactions. The interface for application server allows 
application server to control transaction boundaries for the application being 
managed. The specification also offers Java mapping for the industry standard
X/Open XA protocol, so  transactional resource manager can participate in a 
global transaction that is controlled by external transaction manager. 
(Parkinson 2013, 7.)
In transactional Java EE applications there are two of kinds of transactions, 
container managed and user managed. If the developer uses container 
managed transactions he/she need only to define transaction type for 
methods. Available types are REQUIRED, REQUIRES_NEW, MANDATORY, 
NOT_SUPPORTED and NEVER which can be assigned by using 
Transactional annotation. When using user managed transactions the 
developer will handle start and end of the transaction progmatically. For this 
specification offers UserTransaction interface which has following methods to 
interact with the transaction. (Parkinson 2013, 11 - 25.)
• begin: Create a new transaction and associate it with current thread
• commit: Complete the transaction associated with current thread
• getStatus: obtain the status of the transaction associated with current 
thread
• rollback: Rollback the transaction associated with current thread
• setRollbackOnly: Modify the transaction associated so that its only 
31
outcome can be roll back
• setTransactionTimeout: Modify current threads transactions timeout 
The container managed transactions do not leave much place for misuses and
therefore are not within scope of this master's thesis. Misused user 
transactions, on the other hand can cause dramatic errors in run-time. If a 
transaction is not completed after an operation that needs it, the resource will 
be reserved longer and will cause performance issues.
2.1.3 Security layers
Java EE applications have three security layers application, transport and 
message. Developers usually handle application-layer's security and 
transport-layer and message-layer security are handled by infrastructure or 
application server maintainers. 
The containers which are introduced in chapter 2.1 provide application-layer 
security. As Jendrock and partners report containers can be secured using 
declarative or programmatic security; declarative means using either 
annotations in code or deployment descriptors to define secured resources 
and their authentication and authorization information programmatic security is
embedded in the application itself. The advantage of application-layer security
is that the security is uniquely tailored for the application and it is fine-grained 
with application-specific settings. On the other hand, it is dependent on 
security attributes that cannot be transferred between application types, and 
support for different protocols makes it vulnerable and data is lost or contained
with the point of vulnerability. (Jendrock and co N.D, 47-8 - 47-9.)
The transport-layer security is used to secure data transport between server 
and client. It is fully implemented outside of the application and so it is out of 
the focus of this master's thesis.
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Message-layer security is used to secure SOAP messages or SOAP message
attachments. As Jendrock and partners lights up in their Java EE tutorial, 
WSS is used to implement message-layer security and it is not part of Java 
EE platform; therefore, this level static security analysis is also out of the focus
for this master's thesis (Jendrock and co N.D, 47-8 - 47-9).
2.2 Static Application Testing
Static application testing is usually done by developers with tools that are 
specially developed to analyse source code. Applications source code itself 
has not been executed while performing static application testing so it does 
not need run-time environment for the application. Instead, static application 
testing aims to find violence of best practices rather than trying to prove that 
an application works as planned (Ayewah, Pugh, Hovermeyer, Morgenthaler &
Penix 2010, 22). These best practices include practices from code styling, line
length or use of parentheses to application design that can cause cyclomatic 
complexity. These best practise violations can cause serious vulnerabilities 
like SQL-injections where user can execute unwanted SQL-statement to 
database (Livshits & Lam N.D, 3). The following code example would be 
marked as issue by static application analysis because it does concatenate 
input parameters to SQL-query.
public boolean authenticate(String username, String password){
Connection conn = getConnection();
Statament statement = 
connection.createStatement(
“SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username =\'” + 
username + “\' and password=\'” +        
                           password +”\'”
);
ResultSet rs = statement.execeuteQuery();
return rs.next();
}
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Another example is infinite recursive loops that cause application to crash 
eventually to stack overflow (Ayewah and co, 23).
      public boolean isAuthenticated() {
return this.isAuthenticated();
} 
Beside finding the best practice violation static application analysis tools can 
show code metrics by counting depth of nesting, cyclomatic complexity or 
distinct paths from one line of code to the another (Graham, Veenendall, 
Evans & Black, 73).
2.2.1 SonarQube
SonarQube is an open source platform for source code quality management 
that is developed by SonarSource. SonarQube has four components server, 
database, plugins and scanner. Server has two processes, a web server 
which offers user interface to explore analysed projects and Elasticsearch 
based search server which is used by user interface for queries. The database
is used to store installation's configuration and project analyses. Scanner is 
the component that do the hard part of work by analysing projects and 
sending the results to the SonarQube server. The fourth component contains 
plugins that can be used to extend SonarQube platform's functionalities. 
SonarQube architecture is presented in Figure 7. (Gigleux 2015.) 
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SonarQube can analyse multiple programming languages through language 
plugins (Mallet 2016). Language plugins contains default analysing rules for 
the language they support, however, more rules can be added through rule 
plugins like checkstyle plugin which enforces coding convention standards for 
Java.
 There are two types of rules: standard rules and security related rules. 
Standard rules should not produce any false positive issues where as security 
related rules can produce some false positive issues. Every rule represents a 
single issue type in the code like Exception should be catched instead of 
Throwable. Rules can have tags defined, which makes it easier to categorize 
rules, tags can be something like security, CWE or convention. (Campbell 
2015a.)
The Java Plugin itself contains more than 300 rules for analysing Java source 
code. There are rules for coding conventions, bug detection and security 
problems. Security related rules contains checks for some CERT and CWE 
weaknesses as for some SANS top 25 most dangerous software errors and 
some OWASP top 10 weaknesses. All rules are CWE compatible so it is 
possible to search rules by CWE identifier. (Racodon 2016.)
For all the issues that SonarQube recognizes a severity classification is 
Figure 7: SonarSource architecture (See org. Gigleux 2015)
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applied:, blocker, critical, major, minor and info (Campbell 2015b).  Default 
severity of the rule can be changed to express better company policies for 
example when creating a quality profile. Quality profiles are sets of rules that 
are assigned to projects under analysis (Campbell 2015c). Ideally all projects 
that are implemented with same language would use the same quality profile 
so they can be compared to each other. 
2.3 Application vulnerabilities and how to measure them
Application vulnerabilities are weaknesses in application that users can 
exploit. By exploiting an application's weakness malicious user can affect 
applications functionalities and gain some benefit from this or influence the 
service's confidentiality, integrity or availability which are the three tenets of 
information security as shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: The three tenets of 
information system security (See 
org. Kim; Solomon. 10)
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Weaknesses can be ranked by using different scoring systems like CWSS or 
CVSS. These different scoring systems are presented next.
2.3.1 Common Weaknesses Scoring System 
CWSS (Common Weaknesses Scoring System) offers a mechanism for 
ranking weaknesses in consistent, flexible and open manner. It uses three 
main metric groups to rank weaknesses: Base Finding, Attack Surface and 
Environmental metric group. Each of these metric groups contains multiple 
other metrics that are used to calculate the weakness ranking value (Coley & 
Martin 2014). A full function listing of the sub metrics can be found in Appendix
A: CWSS submetrics.
Base finding metric group expresses the risk of weakness, how accurate the 
finding is and the strength of controls. Attack Surface metric group handles 
how easily attacker can exploit the weakness and Environmental metric group 
specifies the environment and operational context of the weakness. CWSS 
ranking value is calculated by placing the value to each factor in the Base 
Finding metric group and then calculating them to Base Finding sub score 
which will bee between 0 to 100. This same method is used to calculate Attack
Surface and Environmental metric groups which produces value between zero
to one. Finally, these three values are multiplied together to gain final CWSS 
score. The formulas for each sub score are presented in Figure 9. (Coley & 
Martin 2014.)
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2.3.2 Common Vulnerability Scoring System
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) is a similar scoring system 
than CWSS; however, instead of weaknesses it focuses straight on the 
vulnerabilities. So it is kind of one layer higher scoring system as earlier 
mentioned vulnerabilities are weaknesses that have been exploited. Many 
vulnerability that is listed in www.cvedetails.com site uses CVSS contains link 
to the actual weaknesses in http://cwe.mitre.org site. As CWSS CVSS also 
uses three sub metrics, however, they are called metric groups in its ranking 
system: Base, Temporal and Environmental. 
Base metric group is used to characterise vulnerabilities of those variables 
that will not change over the time or the environment. Temporal metric group 
is used to those variables that might changes over time but not across run-
Figure 9: CWSS Score Formulas (Coley; Martin. 2014)
Base Finding subscore 
formula
Environmental subscore 
formula
Attack surface subscore 
formula
Base = [ (10 * TechnicalImpact + 5 * 
(AcquiredPrivilege + acquiredPrivilegeLayer ) + 5*FindingConfidence) * 
f(TechnicalImpact) * InternalControlEffectiveness ] * 4.0
[ 20*(RequiredPrivilege + RequiredPrivilegelayer + AccessVector) + 20 *
DeploymentScope + 15*levelOfInteractions + 5 *
AuthenticationStrength ] / 100.0
[ ( 10*Businessimpact + 3*LikelihoodOfDiscovery + 4*LikelihoodOfExploit) + 
3*Prevalence) * f(BusinessImpact) * ExternalControlEffectiveness ] / 
  20.0
f(BusinessImpact) = 0 if BusinessImpact == 0; otherwise f(BusinessImpact) = 1
 f(TechnicalImpact) = 0 if TechnicalImpact = 0; otherwise f(TechnicalImpact) = 1
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time environment. As in CWSS, the environmental metric group represents 
those variables that are relevant and unique to specific run-time environment. 
This helps organizations to mitigate vulnerability by making changes to run-
time environment. (Hanford, 5-6). All these three metric groups contain sets of 
metrics variables that help define vulnerability score. Only those metric 
variables that belong to Base metric group are mandatory to calculate CVSS 
score as Appendix B: CVSS metric vectors explains.
CVSS produces a ranking value between 0.0 and 10.0. It also produces a 
vector string that represents values that are used to form CVSS value. Its 
format is  (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N) and it is usually displayed with 
vulnerability details as Figure 10 shows. The ranking value itself is calculated 
using formulas in Appendix C: CVSS score formulas. (Hanford 2015, 18 - 19.)
Figure 10: CVSS information example
2.4 Theoretical framework
It is widely studied that with static application testing it is possible to find 
different kinds of coding mistakes that can cause bugs to application. But does
static application testing find security related mistakes that in the Java EE are 
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more or less related to metadata annotations for underlying containers that 
take care of implementation of security mechanisms? Although it is possible 
for developers to do programmatic security to applications, does static 
application analysis know which is the correct way to use the APIs that make it
possible? Or does static application analysis only find coding mistakes that 
are based Java SE's technologies?
I expected that static application analysis does not raise issues about 
inadequate security definitions in Java EE technologies and that it can 
understand the misuse of APIs used to produce programmatic security. 
However, I also expect that by using static application analysis it is possible to 
implement better security to the Java EE applications through the findings it 
does from misuses of the Java SE technologies and misuses of the Java 
language itself.
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3 Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology used to determinate the usefulness of 
SonarQube from security perspective. First subchapter presents how data is 
produced. After that the testing environment is presented and in the end target
of the analysis.
3.1 Data collection
To study what weaknesses the SonarQube can find, a special application was 
developed that contains security weaknesses that are identified in this 
master's thesis, CWE and OWASP top ten. Not all weaknesses from those 
sources are implemented to the application because it would expand the 
master's thesis too much. The selected weaknesses and their implementation 
reference points are listed in Appendix D: Identified weaknesses in Java EE 
technologies and their implementation references
The application is analysed with SonarQube against two quality profiles. The 
first one contains only security related rules that are provided by Java Plugin, 
listed in Appendix E: Java plugins security rules profile, and the second one is 
expanded with rules from third party plugins offering security related rules, 
listed in Appendix F: Security rules profile from multiple plugins. After 
analysing SonarQube the results are mirrored against the lists of known 
weaknesses.
3.2 Static Application Testing environment
This chapter and its sub chapters defines the testing environment and all 
components in it and presents the application under the analysis.
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3.2.1 SonarQube setup
SonarQube is installed to a virtual machine running Arch Linux which has 
Oracle JRE 7 installed for the SonarQube. To SonarQube is added Java 
plugin and PMD, Findbugs, Web and XML plugins. From rules that are 
provided by these plugin, two quality profiles are created. The first one contain
security related rules from Java plugin and the second one contain security 
related rules from all of these plugins. Another virtual machine is used for 
standalone PostgreSQL database where the SonarQube stores configurations
and results. The analysis is done by using SonarQube scanner for Maven 
from developer desktop machine. Specific version of each component are 
presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Test environment component versions
Component Version Comment
SonarQube Platform 5.4
SonarQube scanner for Maven 3.0.1 org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar
-maven-plugin:3.0.1
Java Plugin 3.12 For the Java Language support and 
default rules
PMD plugin 2.5 For enabling more security related 
rules
Findbugs 3.3 For enabling more security related 
rules
Web plugin 2.4 For enabling more security related 
rules
XML plugin 1.4.1 For enabling more security related 
rules
PostgreSQL 9.5.1
Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0_79 64bit build 15
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3.2.2 Target of analysis
The analysed application is a simple application for registering responses to 
invitations with authentication. The application also has management interface
for creating events and their invitations. The applications ready state 
represents software under development. There is only 3041 lines of code so 
application can be concerned as very small application. 
The application was developed for the master's thesis and contains known 
security weaknesses. The application's source code can be found in 
GitHub.com repository called summons owned by Timizki and its tag called 
thesis_frozen. The application is implemented by using the technologies used 
by the assigner. The technologies were also limited further to contain only 
those technologies that were recognized to have possible misuse 
weaknesses. All weaknesses are marked with comment 
“SECURITY_WEAKNESS“ in the code. The Application's structure is 
presented in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Test applications structure
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4 Results 
This chapter present all results gained from the analysis of the test 
application. First is presented how quality profiles were created. After that, the 
results from the analysis of the Java plugins security rules profile are 
presented. After that, the results of the analysis with security rules profile from 
multiple plugins are discussed. The last subchapter analyses the results.
4.1 Creating quality profiles
Empty quality profiles were created from the Quality Profiles page in 
SonarQube. SonarQube askes only the quality profile's name and language, 
however, each additional plugin can add optional fields to the form as Figure 
12 shows.
Figure 12: Create new quality profile dialog
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After empty quality profiles were created, they had to be populated with rules 
which was carried out through rule query page. The rule queries were limited 
by tags and rule repositories. For both quality profiles the same tags was 
used: security, cwe, owasp-a1, owasp-a2, owasp-a3, owasp-a4, owasp-a6 
and owasp-a7. For the first quality profile, vanilla installation's profile, rules 
were limited to SonarQube Java repository and for the second one all 
repositories were included. At the end of each query all results were added to 
the quality profile through bulk change button. 
4.2 Results of the vanilla installations 
The quality profile created from rules offered by the Java plugin contained 70 
security related rules. Ten of those were classified as blocker, 43 as critical, 15
as major and 2 minor. Every rule had at least two tags where one was security
related and another might have been non-security related like bug. The quality
profile contained only 13 rules related to any Java EE technologies, all the 
other rules were targeted for Java language in generally. The Java EE related 
rules are listed in Table 4. Twelve of these rules were classified as critical and 
the last one was classified as major.
Table 4: Java EE security rules in Java Plugin
Severity Rule name
Critical "HttpServletRequest.getRequestedSessionId()" should not be used
Critical Cookies should be "secure"
Critical Credentials should not be hard-coded
Critical Exceptions should not be thrown from servlet methods
Major Exit methods should not be called
Critical Fields in a "Serializable" class should either be transient or serializable
Critical HTTP referers should not be relied on
Critical Non-serializable objects should not be stored in "HttpSessions"
Critical Security constraints should be defined
Critical Struts validation forms should have unique names
Critical Values passed to SQL commands should be sanitized
Critical Web applications should use validation filters
Critical Web applications should not have a "main" method
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With this quality profile SonarQube was able to detect 24 issues. From these 
issues 14 were Java EE related and they are presented in Table 5. Two rules 
raised four issues each, in different places. Thus, only eight unique issues 
were found. All issues that was found are listed in Appendix G: Security issues
with Java plugin appendix contains also more information about the issues.     
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Table 5: Java EE related issues found with Java Plugin's security rules
Keys Severity Tags message
JDS-1 CRITICAL
cwe, jee, owasp-a7,
security, websphere
Add "security-constraint" elements
to this descriptor.
JDS-12, JDS-
13, JDS-14, 
JDS-15
CRITICAL
cert, cwe, error-
handling, owasp-
a6, security
Add a "try/catch" block for 
"forward".
JDS-16 CRITICAL
cert, cwe, error-
handling, owasp-
a6, security
Add a "try/catch" block for 
"sendRedirect".
JDS-2 CRITICAL
injection, owas,p-
a1, security
Add a validation filter to this 
"web.xml".
JDS-5 CRITICAL
cwe, owasp-a2, 
owasp-a6, security
Add the "secure" attribute to this 
cookie
JDS-6 CRITICAL bug, cwe
Make "Invitation" serializable or 
don't store it in the session.
JDS-3, JDS-4, 
JSD-8, JDS-10
CRITICAL
bug, cwe, 
serialization
Make "<variable name>" transient 
or serializable.
JDS-18 CRITICAL
cwe, owasp-a2, 
sans-top25-porous,
security
Remove this hard-coded 
password.
The analysis was started with Maven by command mvn clean verify 
sonar:sonar which started sonar-maven-plugin. The whole build took 
approximate only 42 seconds as Figure 13 shows.
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4.3 Security tuned installations results
The second analysis was done by using quality profile that contained rules 
from all plugins; thus, it contained all rules from the first quality profile and 74 
more security related rules from other plugins. New rules were gathered from 
FindBugs, SonarQube Web and PMD plugin repositories. In total the second 
quality profile contained 144 active security related rules. From these rules 40 
were Java EE related, and they are listed in Table 6.
Figure 13: Analyze time with Java plugin security rules profile
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Table 6: Java EE related security rules in second quality profile
Severity Rule Name
Critical
"HttpServletRequest.getRequestedSessionId()" should not be 
used
Critical Cookies should be "secure"
Critical Credentials should not be hard-coded
Critical Exceptions should not be thrown from servlet methods
Major Exit methods should not be called
Critical
Fields in a "Serializable" class should either be transient or 
serializable
Critical HTTP referers should not be relied on
Critical Non-serializable objects should not be stored in "HttpSessions"
Critical Security constraints should be defined
Critical Struts validation forms should have unique names
Critical Values passed to SQL commands should be sanitized
Critical Web applications should use validation filters
Critical Web applications should not have a "main" method
Major Absolute path traversal in servlet
Major Relative path traversal in servlet
Minor
Security - A prepared statement is generated from a nonconstant
String
Minor Security - Found JAX-RS REST Endpoint
               
Major Security - Hard Coded Password
Blocker Security - Hardcoded constant database password
Minor Security - HTTP Headers Untrusted
Major Security - HTTP Response splitting vulnerability
Major Security - JSP reflected cross site scripting vulnerability
Critical
Security - Nonconstant string passed to execute method on an 
SQL statement
Critical Security - Potential SQL/JPQL Injection (JPA)
Critical Security - JSP reflected cross site scripting vulnerability
Critical Security - Potential XSS in JSP
Minor Security - Potentially Sensitive Data in Cookie
Critical Security - Potential XSS in Servlet
Critical Security - Servlet reflected cross site scripting vulnerability
Critical Security - Servlet reflected cross site scripting vulnerability
Minor Security - Untrusted Content-Type Header
Minor Security - Untrusted Hostname Header
Minor Security - Untrusted Query String
Minor Security - Untrusted Referer Header
Minor Security - Untrusted Servlet Parameter
Minor Security - Untrusted Session Cookie Value
Minor Security - Untrusted User-Agent Header
Major Security - Unvalidated Redirect
Major Security - XSSRequestWrapper is Weak XSS Protection
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Before rerunning a static analysis with Maven the old analysis was deleted 
from SonarQube platform and the second quality profile was set as default 
profile. The analysis produced 27 issues at this time. From these issues 
seventeen were Java EE related which are listed in Table 7. Also this time two 
rules found four issues different places and because of that only eleven 
unique issues were identified. As with the first analysis all the rest issues were
related to Java in generally. All issues that were found are listed in Appendix 
H: Security issues with multiple plugins.
Table 7: Java EE related issues found with security rules from 
multiple plugins
Key Severity Tags Message
JES-25 CRITICAL
injection, owasp-a1, 
security
                                                     
Add a validation filter to this 
"web.xml".
JES-24 CRITICAL
cwe, jee, owasp-a7, 
security, websphere
Add "security-constraint" 
elements to this descriptor.
JES-17, JES-18, 
JES-19, JES-20
CRITICAL
cert, cwe, error-
handling, owasp-a6, 
security
Add a "try/catch" block for 
"forward".
JES-21 CRITICAL
cert, cwe, error-
handling, owasp-a6, 
security
Add a "try/catch" block for 
"sendRedirect".
JES-10 CRITICAL
cwe, owasp-a2, 
owasp-a6, security
Add the "secure" attribute to this 
cookie
JES-22 MAJOR cwe, owasp-a3
HTTP parameter directly written 
to HTTP header output in 
io.vksn.summons.ui.servlet.Redir
ectServlet.doGet(HttpServletReq
uest, HttpServletResponse)
JES-11 CRITICAL bug, cwe Make "Invitation" serializable or don't store it in the session.
JES-8, JES-9, 
JES-13, JES-15 CRITICAL
bug, cwe, 
serialization
Make "<variable name>" 
transient or serializable.
JES-2 CRITICAL
cwe, owasp-a2, 
sans-top25-porous, 
security
Remove this hard-coded 
password.
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Key Severity Tags Message
JES-5 CRITICAL
cwe, injection, 
owasp-a1, security, 
wasc
The query is potentially 
vulnerable SQL/JPQL injection
JES-23 MAJOR cwe, security, wasc Unvalidated Redirect
The second analysis took 12 seconds longer to finish meaning a total 
approximate build time of 54 seconds as Figure 14 shows.
4.4 Analysis of results
SonarQube was able to find issues from Java SE technologies as Java EE 
technologies, although there were more Java SE related issues than Java EE 
related issue. This was expected as the application contained more Java SE 
related code than Java EE. The SonarQube was able to find eleven unique 
weaknesses out of the 35 Java EE weaknesses implemented in the test 
application. In total there were 44 different recognized weaknesses, one of 
those, MTW-17, was detected by a compiler giving compile error.
The vanilla installation found seven of these eleven issues whereas security 
tuned installation found all the issues. However, when rule count is taken into 
account there is not such a big difference since the security tuned installation 
had more than 50% more rules. The issues which were found are mapped to 
identified weaknesses in Table 8. SonarQube did found one issue that was not
Figure 14: Analyze time with extended security rules profile
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identified in the master's thesis. The issue was about storing non-serialiable 
object to session. Even though SonarQube was able to find some 
weaknesses from owasp top ten categories, it does not mean that all of them 
were to be found because weaknesses in the categories can be implemented 
in many ways and almost in all Java EE technologies.
Table 8: Issues mapped to identified weaknesses
Weakness identifier Issue identifier
MTW-2 JDS-18 JES-2
MTW-8 JES-5
OWASP-A1 JDS-2, JDS-25
OWASP-A3 JES-22
OWASP-A7 JDS-1, JES-24
OWASP-A10 JES-23
CWE-536
JDS-12, JDS-13, JDS-14, JDS-15, JDS-16, 
JES-17,JES-18, JES-19,JES-20, JES-21
CWE-594
JDS-4, JDS-10,JDS-3, JDS-8, 
JES-9, JES-13, JES-15, JES-8
CWE-600
JDS-12, JDS-13, JDS-14, JDS-15, JDS-16, 
JES-17,JES-18, JES-19,JES-20, JES-21
CWE-601 JES-23
CWE-614 JDS-5, JES-10
Weakness not 
identified 
JDS-6, 
JES-11
Even though SonarQube was not able to find all weaknesses it is not 
catastrophe because SonarQube did not report any false positive issues 
either, which makes SonarQube more reliable and decreases the time to be 
used to ensure the correctness of bugs. The time used to resolve bug was 
reduced even more because most of the rules in SonarQube offers clear 
52
information on what is a noncompliant solution and what is a compliant 
solution as Figure 15 shows. This offers also a good way to all developers to 
learn how some specific thing in code should be done even if they do not fix 
the bug. All issues were also clearly listed and categorized by file.
Even though there were more than 50% more rules in the second quality 
profile the analysis time did not increase proportionately as much. This 
encourages to create quality profiles that contain a large amount of rules and 
still developers could run the analysis quickly and often and get feedback from
SonarQube.
SonarQube's Java plugin itself offers good set of rules that are able find 
reliable security issues from Java EE and Java SE code. And when quality 
profiles are enriched rules form the other plugins SonarQube's capabilities are
even more reliable; however, there is still long way to go before SonarQube 
can find even all the major security issues. There is also some parties that 
works with the SonarSource to bring more security rules to SonarQube's Java 
plugin. This will ensure that SonarQube's capability to find security issues will 
get better in the future. 
Figure 15: Issue explanation
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5 Conlusions
The objectives that were set to this master's thesis were reasonable and 
achievable. The research questions and restrictions set to the master's thesis 
guided me through the work. Without the restrictions research background 
would have increased too much to be carefully covered in the implementation 
phase.
The results shows that SonarQube can be used to improve Java EE 
application's security because SonarQube is Java EE and Java SE technology
aware more or less. The test application developed for this master's thesis 
should be peer reviewed or evaluated to make sure that the security 
weaknesses are implemented correctly to be found. Also, the security 
weaknesses recognized in this master's thesis marked with identifier MTW-* 
should be evaluated to ensure that they are real weaknesses.
In the implementation phase when analysing the results it was hard to draw a 
line which of the rules was related to Java EE and which to Java SE, however 
in the end it does not matter so much because they all involved the security 
aspect. To get more reliable results the test applications should contain more 
security weaknesses. Weaknesses should be implemented in many different 
ways so that SonarQube's ability to detect different weakness variants could 
be studied. However, it is time consuming to implement weaknesses so that 
they mirror even somehow the real world use cases.  
SonarQube pefromed better in detecting weaknesses from the Java EE 
application than was expected, which is a good thing. However, it still can 
detect only the tip of the iceberg from the all possible weaknesses. Luckily, 
SonarSource and other parties are working to improve the SonarQube's 
security weakness detection capabilities in every release.
To me this master's thesis was very interesting to do because I had to study 
many Java EE specifications to get an understanding if they have possible 
security weaknesses, and on the side of that I could gather much valuable 
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knowledge about those technologies. When studying those technologies there
was a worry about what the security state of reference implementations of 
those technologies is, and it would be interesting to study security of Oracle's 
JDK and Open JDK. Another issue that came to my mind while writing this 
master's thesis was how static application testing could effectively be a part of 
the software development process and how other parties, like project 
managers, could use information it produces.
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Appendices
Appendix A: CWSS submetrics
Group Name Summary
Base Finding Technical Impact 
(TI)
The pontential result that can be produced 
by the weakness, assuming that the weakness 
can be successfully reached and exploited.
Base Finding Acquired 
Privilege (AP)
The type of privileges that are obtained by 
an attacker who can successfully exploit the
weakness.
Base Finding Acquired 
Privilege Layer 
(AL)
The operational layer to which the attacker 
gains privileges by successfully exploiting 
the weakness.
Base Finding Internal Control 
Effectiveness 
(IC)
The ability of the control to render the 
weakness that can be exploited by an 
attacker.
Base Finding Finding 
Confidence (FC)
The confidence that the reported issue is a 
weakness that can be utilized by an 
attacker.
Attack 
Surface
Required 
Privilege (RP)
The type of privileges that an attacker must
already have in order to reach the 
code/functionality that contains the 
weakness.
Attack 
Surface
Required 
Privilege Layer 
(RL)
The operational layer to which the attacker 
must have privileges in order to attempt to 
attack the weakness.
Attack 
Surface
Access Vector 
(AV)
The channel through which an attacker must 
communicate to reach the code or 
functionality that contains the weakness.
Attack 
Surface
Authentication 
Strenght (AS)
The strengthj of the authentication routine 
that protects the code/functionality that 
contains the weakness.
Attack 
Surface
Level of 
Interaction (IN)
The actions that are required by the human 
victim(s) to enable a successful attack to 
take place.
Attack 
Surface
Deployment Scope 
(SC)
Whether the weakness is present in all 
deployable instances of the software, or if 
it is limited to a subset of platforms 
and/or configurations.
Enviromental Business Impact 
(BI)
The potential impact to the business or 
mission if the weakness can be successfully 
exploited.
Enviromental Likelihood of 
Discovery (DI)
The likelihood that an attacker can discover
the weakness.
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Enviromental Likelihood of 
Exploit (EX)
The likelihood that, if the weakness is 
discovered, an attacker with the required 
privileges/authentication/access would be 
able to successfully exploit it.
Enviromental External Control 
Effectiveness 
(EC)
The capability of controls or mitigations 
outside of the software that may render the 
weakness more dificult for an attacker to 
reach and/or trigger.
Enviromental Prevalence (P) How frequently this type of weakness appears
in software.
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Appendix B: CVSS metric vectors
Group name Metric name Possible 
value
Mandatory
Base Attact Vector, AV [N,A,L,P] True
Base Attack Complexity, AC [L,H] True
Base Priveleges required, PR [N,L,H] True
Base User Interaction, UI [N,R] True
Base Scope, S [U,C] True
Base Confidentiality, C [H,L,N] True
Base Integrity, I [H,L,N] True
Base Availability, A [H,L,N] True
Temporal Exploit code maturity, E [X,H,F,P,U] False
Temporal Remediation level, RL [X,U,W,T,O] False
Temporal Report confidence, RC [X,C,R,U] False
Environmental Confidentiality req., CR [X,H,M,L] False
Environmental Integrity req., IR [X,H,M,L] False
Environmental Availibility req., AR [X,H,M,L] False
Environmental Modified attack vector, MAV [X,N,A,L,P] False
Environmental Modified attack complexity, 
MAC
[X,L,H] False
Environmental Modified privileges required,
MPR
[X,N,L,H] False
Environmental Modified user interaction, 
MUI
[X,N,R] False
Environmental Modified scope, MS [X,U,C] False
Environmental Modified confidentiality, MC [X,N,L,H] False
Environmental Modified integrity, MI [X,N,L,H] False
Environmental Modified availibility, MA [X,N,L,H] False
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Appendix C: CVSS score formulas
Base metric group
Base score
If (Impact sub score =< 0) 0 else,
Scope Unchanged[4] Round up (Minimum [(Impact + 
Exploitability),10])
Scope Changed Round up (Minumum [1.08 × (Impact + 
Exploitability),10])
Impact sub score (ISC)
Scope Unchanged 6.42 × ISCBase
Scope Changed 7.52 × [ISCBase−0.029] − 3.25 × [ISCBase−0.02]15
ISCBase = 1 - [(1−ImpactConf) × (1−ImpactInteg) × (1−ImpactAvail)]
Exploitability sub score
8.22 × AttackVector × AttackComplexity × PrivilegeRequired × 
UserIntercation
Temporal metric group
Temporal score
Round up(BaseScore × ExploitCodeMaturity × RemediationLevel × 
ReportConfidence)
Environmental metric group
Enviromental score
If (Modified Impact Sub score =< 0) 0 else,
If Modified Scope Unchanged Round up(Round up (Minimum [
  × (M.Impact + M.Exploitability),10])
  × Exploit Code Maturity
  × Remediation Level
  × Report Confidence)
If Modified Scope Changed Round up(Round up (Minimum [1.08
  × (M.Impact + M.Exploitability),10])
  × Exploit Code Maturity
  × Remediation Level
  × Report Confidence))
Modified impact sub score
If Modified Scope Unchanged 6.42 × [ISCModified]
If Modified Scope Changed 7.52 × [ISCModified−0.029] - 3.25 
× [ISCModified−0.02]15
ISCModified = Minimum[[1−(1−M.IConf × CR)×(1−M.IInteg × IR)
×(1−M.IAvail × AR)],0.915]
Modified exploitability sub scroe
8.22 × M.AttackVector × M.AttackComplexity 
× M.PrivilegeRequired × M.UserInteraction
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Appendix D: Identified weaknesses in Java EE technologies and 
their implementation references
Identi
fier
Name Description Implementati
on reference
MTW-1 Do not use  Java SE
concurrency API in 
Java EE application
Container is not aware threads 
started through Java SE 
concurrency API and they can 
cause race conditions
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_4: 
MTW-2 DataSourceDefinitio
n have password 
defined
The specification encourages not 
to add password to 
DataSourceDefinition annotation
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_8
MTW-3 Services access 
have not been 
limited
Service does not declare  RunAs, 
RolesAllowed, PermitAll, DenyAll 
or DeclaredRoles annotations to 
restrict access to service
Application 
does not 
restrict any 
public 
interfaces
MTW-4 JAX-RS annotated 
properties should 
not be written 
other lifecycle 
phase than creation
JAX-RS annotated resource 
properties should not be written 
other life cycle phase than 
creation because it can cause 
errors in concurrency
Not 
implemented
MTW-5 Non-public methods 
should not be 
annotated with 
@Path annotation
 Non-public methods with @Path 
annotation can not be accessed 
outside of application and 
therefore are unnecessary 
annotations
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_12
MTW-6 @PATH annotation 
could use regular 
expression to white
list accepted paths
By using  regular expression 
services possible access paths 
could be limited and therefore 
attack surface would be smaller
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_2
MTW-7 JAX-RS service 
should use bean 
validation to 
validate methods 
parameters
All input to service should be 
handled as insecure to increase 
security.
Application 
does not 
validate any 
input
MTW-8 JPQL injection by 
miuse of 
createQuery method
If JPQL-query is concatened from 
input parameters the query is not
parsed by JPA
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_1
MTW-9 Using container in 
construction of 
servlet
Servlets are iniatialized through
init-method and are not active in
container befor this
Not 
implemented
MTW-10 Sevlets service 
method is marked as
synchronized
Performance can be lost if 
servlets service methods is 
marked as  synchronized
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_9
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MTW-11 Request objects 
other  methods than
startAsync and 
completed should 
not be accesed 
multiple threads
Request objects startAsync and 
complete methods are only threads
safe methods in class. Accessing 
other methods from multiple 
threads can cause concurrency 
problems
Not 
implemented
MTW-12 Response objects 
other  methods than
startAsync and 
completed should 
not be accesed 
multiple threads
Response objects startAsync and 
complete methods are only threads
safe methods in class. Accessing 
other methods from multiple 
threads can cause concurrency 
problems
Not 
implemented
MTW-13 Servlets  
getResource and 
getResourceAsStream
methods should use 
only for static 
resources
If dynamic resources, like jsp 
pages, are acquired through 
getResource or 
getResourceAsStream methods they 
will not be processed by servlet
Not 
implemented
MTW-14 Servlet should use 
sendError method 
instead of throwing
exception to 
indicate error
Servlets sendError method adds 
appropriate header information to
response
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_11
MTW-15 Servlets session 
timeout should not 
be infinite
If servlets session timeout is 
set to zero , session will not be
timeouted and it can reserve 
unnecessarry server resources.
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_10
MTW-16 ConstraintValidator
should not store 
validated value to 
its state
ConstrainValidator instances can 
be reused and therefore it should
not store validated value to its 
state
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_21
MTW-17 Constraint is 
defined to 
unsupported type
Constraints that are bound to 
unsupported type will cause 
UnexpectedTypeException to raise
Not 
implemented 
because IDE 
gives 
compiler 
error when 
applying 
wrong type 
constraint
MTW-18 Components value 
should not be 
accessed through 
component tree
JavaServer Faces components value
should not be obtained through 
component three because it is not
necessarry been validated yet.
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_25
MTW-19 User managed 
transaction 
associated with 
current thread 
should be mark as 
completed
Developer starts transaction with
commit method invocation but 
commit, rollback or setRollback 
method is never called.
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_9
MTW-20 Stateless session 
bean should not 
store client state 
to beans member 
variables
Container can reuse stateless 
session bean instances between 
clients so clients confidential 
data can be exposed to other 
clients
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_5
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MTW-21 Storing client 
state to singleton 
session bean can 
cause lose of 
confidentiality
Same singleton session bean 
instance is shared between all 
clients, therefore it can expose 
clients confidential data to 
other clients
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_3
MTW-22 BindingProvider 
should not be used 
to hard code 
username and 
password
Hard coded passwords and 
usernames are harder and slower 
to change when needed.
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_7
MTW-23 @WebService 
annotations should 
define namespace
Missing namespace can cause 
conflicts in services published 
in same endpoint address.
Not 
implemented 
because 
application 
server failed
obtain 
reference to 
web service 
missing 
namespace
OWASP-
A1
A1 - Injection Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS,
and LDAP injection occur when 
untrusted data is sent to an 
interpreter as part of a command 
or query (OWASP Top 10 2013, 6). 
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_1
OWASP-
A2
A2 - Broken 
Authentication and 
Session Management
Application to compromise 
passwords, keys, or session 
tokens, or have other 
implementation flaws so attacker 
can assume other user's 
identities (OWASP Top 10 2013, 
6).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-20
OWASP-
A3
A3 - Cross-site 
scripting 
XSS flaws occur whenever an 
application takes untrusted data 
and sends it to a web browser 
without proper validation or 
escaping (OWASP Top 10 2013, 6).
All 
applications 
public 
interfaces 
are missing 
validation
OWASP-
A4
A4 - Insecure 
direct object 
references
A direct object reference occurs 
when a developer exposes a 
reference to an internal 
implementation object, such as a 
file, directory, or database key 
(OWASP Top 10 2013, 6).
Every class 
in 
io.vksn.summo
ns.entity 
package  
exposes 
atleast 
database key 
with direct 
reference
OWASP-
A6
A6 - Sensitive data
exposure
Web application do not properly 
protect sensitive data, such as 
credit cards, tax IDs, and 
authentication credentials. 
Attackers may steal or modify 
such weakly protected data. 
(OWASP Top 10 2013, 6)
Application 
does not 
protect any 
data
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OWASP-
A7
A7 - Missing 
function level 
access controll
Web applications verify function 
level access rights before making
that functionality visible in the
UI. However, applications need to
perform the same access control 
checks on the server when each 
function is accessed. (OWASP Top 
10 2013, 6)
None of 
public 
interface 
functions 
limits access
rights
OWASP-
A8
A8 - Cross-site 
request forgery
A CSRF attack forces a logged-on 
victim’s browser to send a forged
HTTP request, including the 
victim’s session cookie and any 
other automatically included 
authentication information, to a 
vulnerable web application (OWASP
Top 10 2013, 6).  
Applications 
servlet does 
not implement
any CSRF 
protection 
mechanisms.
OWASP-
A10
A10 - Unvalidated 
redirects and 
forwards
Web applications redirect or 
forward users to other pages and 
websites, and use untrusted data 
to determine the destination 
pages. Without proper validation,
attackers can redirect victims to
phishing or malware sites, or use
forwards to access unauthorized 
pages. (OWASP Top 10 2013, 6) 
ECURITY_WEAKN
ESS: 
weakness_22
CWE-
536
Information 
Exposure Through 
Servlet Runtime 
Error Message
A servlet error message indicates
that application does not handle 
all errors correctly (Martin, 
Coley, Kenderdine and Piper 2015,
879).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_11
CWE-
574
EJB Bad Practices: 
Use of 
Synchronization 
Primitives.
Application violates EJB 
specification by using thread 
synchronization primitives.
(Martin, Coley, Kenderdine and 
Piper 2015, 916 - 917).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness_26
CWE-
575
EJB Bad Practices: 
Use of AWT Swing
EJB session bean uses AWT or 
Swing classes in implementation 
(Martin, Coley, Kenderdine and 
Piper 2015, 917 - 919)
Not 
implemented 
because Swing
and AWT are 
outdated 
technologies
CWE-
576
EJB Bad Practices: 
Use of Java I/O
Application uses classes from 
java.io package and will not 
behave consistently between EJB 
containers (Martin, Coley, 
Kenderdine and Piper 2015, 919 - 
920).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-23
CWE-
577
EJB Bad Practices: 
Use of Sockets
Application implements Socket 
server as EJB which conflicts 
basic function of the EJB 
(Martin, Coley, Kenderdine and 
Piper 2015, 920 - 922).
Not 
implemented
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CWE-
578
EJB Bad Practices: 
Use of Class Loader
Application creates or obtains 
current class loader from EJB 
which can compromise containers 
security (Martin, Coley, 
Kenderdine and Piper 2015, 922 - 
923).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-24
CWE-
579
J2EE Bad Practices:
Non-serializable 
Object Stored in 
Session
The application stores a non-
serializable object as an 
HttpSession attribute which cause
that session cannot be replicated
(Martin, Coley, Kenderdine and 
Piper 2015, 924).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-16
CWE-
594
J2EE Framework: 
Saving 
Unserializable 
Objects to Disk
Application uses in the J2EE 
container non-seriazable classes 
which can cause application to 
crash if they are tried to 
serializate to disk (Martin, 
Coley, Kenderdine and Piper 2015,
)
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-15
CWE-
598
Information 
Exposure Through 
Query Strings in 
GET Request
Application uses the GET method 
to process request that contains 
sensitive infomation like social 
security number. These URLs can 
be exposed later through the 
browser's history. (Martin, 
Coley, Kenderdine and Piper 2015,
944).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-14
CWE-
600
Uncaught Exception 
in Servlet 
Application leaks technical 
exceptions from public interfaces
like servlets that can reveal 
sensitive debuggind information 
(Martin, Coley, Kenderdine and 
Piper 2015, 946).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-13
CWE-
601
URL Redirection to 
Untrusted Site 
('Open Redirect')
Application accepts user-
controlled input as target of 
external link (Martin, Coley, 
Kenderdine and Piper 2015, 946 - 
950).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-22
CWE-
614
Sensitive Cookie in
HTTPS Session 
Without 'Secure' 
Attribute
Application sets cookie with 
sensitive data without calling 
setSecure(true) method (Martin, 
Coley, Kenderdine and Piper 2015,
966 - 967).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-17
CWE-
615
Information 
Exposure Through 
Comments
Comments that are in view layer 
expose applications structure or 
known bugs (Martin, Coley, 
Kenderdine and Piper 2015, 967 - 
968).
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-18,
SECURITY_WEAK
NESS: 
weakness-19
68
Appendix E: Java plugins security rules profile
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<profile>
<name>Java-security</name>
<language>java</language>
<rules>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>AssignmentInSubExpressionCheck</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>CallToDeprecatedMethod</key>
<priority>MINOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>ClassVariableVisibilityCheck</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>ObjectFinalizeCheck</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>ObjectFinalizeOverridenCallsSuperFinalizeCheck</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S00112</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1143</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1145</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1147</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1148</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1174</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
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<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1181</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1182</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1193</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1194</key>
<priority>MINOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1206</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1217</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S128</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1313</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1444</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1696</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1698</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1724</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1850</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
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<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1854</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1872</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1873</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1948</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1989</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2039</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2068</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2070</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2076</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2077</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2078</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2089</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
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<key>S2092</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2095</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2096</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2142</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2151</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2184</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2221</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2222</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2225</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2245</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2250</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2254</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2257</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
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<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2258</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2259</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2276</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2277</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2278</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2384</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2386</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2441</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2583</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2653</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2658</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2976</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3066</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
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<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3318</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3355</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3369</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3374</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S864</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S888</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>StringEqualityComparisonCheck</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>SwitchLastCaseIsDefaultCheck</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
</rules>
</profile>
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Appendix F: Security rules profile from multiple plugins
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<profile>
<name>extended-security</name>
<language>java</language>
<rules>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>DMI_CONSTANT_DB_PASSWORD</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>HRS_REQUEST_PARAMETER_TO_HTTP_HEADER</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>PT_ABSOLUTE_PATH_TRAVERSAL</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>PT_RELATIVE_PATH_TRAVERSAL</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SQL_NONCONSTANT_STRING_PASSED_TO_EXECUTE</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SQL_PREPARED_STATEMENT_GENERATED_FROM_NONCONSTANT_STRING</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XSS_REQUEST_PARAMETER_TO_JSP_WRITER</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XSS_REQUEST_PARAMETER_TO_SEND_ERROR</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XSS_REQUEST_PARAMETER_TO_SERVLET_WRITER</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ANDROID_BROADCAST</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ANDROID_EXTERNAL_FILE_ACCESS</key>
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<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ANDROID_GEOLOCATION</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ANDROID_WEB_VIEW_JAVASCRIPT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ANDROID_WEB_VIEW_JAVASCRIPT_INTERFACE</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ANDROID_WORLD_WRITABLE</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>BAD_HEXA_CONVERSION</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>BLOWFISH_KEY_SIZE</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>CIPHER_INTEGRITY</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>COMMAND_INJECTION</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>COOKIE_USAGE</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>CUSTOM_MESSAGE_DIGEST</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>DES_USAGE</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ECB_MODE</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
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<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>ESAPI_ENCRYPTOR</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>FILE_UPLOAD_FILENAME</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>HARD_CODE_KEY</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>HARD_CODE_PASSWORD</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>HAZELCAST_SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>JAXRS_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>JAXWS_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>LDAP_INJECTION</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>NULL_CIPHER</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>PADDING_ORACLE</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>PATH_TRAVERSAL_IN</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>PATH_TRAVERSAL_OUT</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>PREDICTABLE_RANDOM</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
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</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>REDOS</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>RSA_KEY_SIZE</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>RSA_NO_PADDING</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SCRIPT_ENGINE_INJECTION</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_CONTENT_TYPE</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_HEADER</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_HEADER_REFERER</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_HEADER_USER_AGENT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_PARAMETER</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_QUERY_STRING</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_SERVER_NAME</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SERVLET_SESSION_ID</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SPEL_INJECTION</key>
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<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SPRING_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SQL_INJECTION_HIBERNATE</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SQL_INJECTION_JDO</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>SQL_INJECTION_JPA</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>STATIC_IV</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>STRUTS1_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>STRUTS2_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>STRUTS_FORM_VALIDATION</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>TAPESTRY_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>UNENCRYPTED_SOCKET</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>UNVALIDATED_REDIRECT</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>WEAK_FILENAMEUTILS</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
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<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>WEAK_MESSAGE_DIGEST</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>WEAK_TRUST_MANAGER</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>WICKET_ENDPOINT</key>
<priority>INFO</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XML_DECODER</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XPATH_INJECTION</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XSS_JSP_PRINT</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XSS_REQUEST_WRAPPER</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XSS_SERVLET</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XXE_DOCUMENT</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XXE_SAXPARSER</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>findsecbugs</repositoryKey>
<key>XXE_XMLREADER</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>pmd</repositoryKey>
<key>ArrayIsStoredDirectly</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>pmd</repositoryKey>
<key>MethodReturnsInternalArray</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
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</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>AssignmentInSubExpressionCheck</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>CallToDeprecatedMethod</key>
<priority>MINOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>ClassVariableVisibilityCheck</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>ObjectFinalizeCheck</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>ObjectFinalizeOverridenCallsSuperFinalizeCheck</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S00112</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1143</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1145</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1147</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1148</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1174</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1181</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1182</key>
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<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1193</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1194</key>
<priority>MINOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1206</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1217</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S128</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1313</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1444</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1696</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1698</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1724</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1850</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1854</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
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<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1872</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1873</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1948</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S1989</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2039</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2068</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2070</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2076</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2077</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2078</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2089</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2092</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2095</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
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</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2096</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2142</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2151</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2184</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2221</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2222</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2225</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2245</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2250</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2254</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2257</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2258</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2259</key>
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<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2276</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2277</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2278</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2384</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2386</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2441</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2583</key>
<priority>BLOCKER</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2653</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2658</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S2976</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3066</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3318</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
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<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3355</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3369</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S3374</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S864</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>S888</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>StringEqualityComparisonCheck</key>
<priority>CRITICAL</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
<rule>
<repositoryKey>squid</repositoryKey>
<key>SwitchLastCaseIsDefaultCheck</key>
<priority>MAJOR</priority>
<parameters />
</rule>
</rules>
</profile>
Appendix G: Security issues with Java plugin
Key Rule Severity Module File Line Tags message
JDS-
1
squid
:S336
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui WEB-INF/web.xml
cwe, jee, 
owasp-a7, 
security, 
websphere
Add "security-
constraint" 
elements to this
descriptor.
JDS-
2
squid
:S335
5
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui WEB-INF/web.xml
injection, 
owas,p-a1, 
security
Add a validation
filter to this 
"web.xml".
JDS-
3
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Creat
eEventBean.java
38
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "service" 
transient or 
serializable.
JDS-
4
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Creat
eEventBean.java
41
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "event" 
transient or 
serializable.
JDS-
5
squid
:S209
2
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Parti
cipateBean.java
100
cwe, owasp-
a2, owasp-
a6, 
security
Add the "secure"
attribute to 
this cookie
86
JDS-
6
squid
:S244
1
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Parti
cipateBean.java
93 bug, cwe
Make 
"Invitation" 
serializable or 
don't store it 
in the session.
JDS-
7
squid
:S222
1
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tEventsServlet.
java
37
cwe, error-
handling, 
security
Catch a list of 
specific 
exception 
subtypes 
instead.
JDS-
8
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tEventsServlet.
java
25
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "service" 
transient or 
serializable.
JDS-
9
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tEventsServlet.
java
39
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block.
JDS-
10
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
22
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "service" 
transient or 
serializable.
JDS-
11
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
31
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"parseLong".
JDS-
12
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
34
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JDS-
13
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
34
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JDS-
14
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
36
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JDS-
15
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
36
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JDS-
16
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Red
irectServlet.ja
va
23
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"sendRedirect".
JDS-
17
squid
:S114
8
CRITI
CAL
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/ejb/AuditLogge
r.java
38
error-
handling, 
security
Use a logger to 
log this 
exception.
JDS-
18
squid
:S206
8
CRITI
CAL
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Lis
tEventsReposito
ry.java
22
cwe, owasp-
a2, sans-
top25-
porous, 
security
Remove this 
hard-coded 
password.
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JDS-
19
squid
:S222
1
CRITI
CAL
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Lis
tEventsReposito
ry.java
44
cwe, error-
handling, 
security
Catch a list of 
specific 
exception 
subtypes 
instead.
JDS-
20
squid
:S001
12
CRITI
CAL
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Lis
tEventsReposito
ry.java
46
cwe, error-
handling, 
security
Define and throw
a dedicated 
exception 
instead of using
a generic one.
JDS-
21
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/rest/model/Sea
tingPlan.java
21
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Return a copy of
"tables".
JDS-
22
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
summons-
service
java/io/vksn/su
mmons/rest/mode
l/SeatingPlan.j
ava
24
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Store a copy of 
"tables".
JDS-
23
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
summons-
api
io/vksn/summons
/entity/Table.j
ava
83
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Return a copy of
"chairs".
JDS-
24
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
summons-
api
io/vksn/summons
/entity/Table.j
ava
86
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Store a copy of 
"chairs".
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Appendix H: Security issues with multiple plugins
Key Rule Severity Module File Line Tags Message
JES-
1
squid
:S001
12
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Lis
tEventsReposito
ry.java
46
cwe, error-
handling, 
security
Define and 
throw a 
dedicated 
exception 
instead of 
using a generic
one.
JES-
2
squid
:S206
8
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Lis
tEventsReposito
ry.java
22
cwe, owasp-
a2, sans-
top25-
porous, 
security
Remove this 
hard-coded 
password.
JES-
3
squid
:S222
1
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Lis
tEventsReposito
ry.java
44
cwe, error-
handling, 
security
Catch a list of
specific 
exception 
subtypes 
instead.
JES-
4
squid
:S114
8
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/ejb/AuditLogge
r.java
38
error-
handling, 
security
Use a logger to
log this 
exception.
JES-
5
finds
ecbug
s:SQL
_INJE
CTION
_JPA
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/repository/Sum
monsRepository.
java
81
cwe, 
injection, 
owasp-a1, 
security, 
wasc
The query is 
potentially 
vulnerable 
SQL/JPQL 
injection
JES-
6
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
ioio/vksn/summo
ns/rest/model/S
eatingPlan.java
21
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Return a copy 
of "tables".
JES-
7
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
service
io/vksn/summons
/rest/model/Sea
tingPlan.java
24
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Store a copy of
"tables".
JES-
8
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Creat
eEventBean.java
38
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "service" 
transient or 
serializable.
JES-
9
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Creat
eEventBean.java
41
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "event" 
transient or 
serializable.
JES-
10
squid
:S209
2
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Parti
cipateBean.java
100
cwe, owasp-
a2, owasp-
a6, 
security
Add the 
"secure" 
attribute to 
this cookie
JES-
11
squid
:S244
1
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/beans/Parti
cipateBean.java
93 bug, cwe
Make 
"Invitation" 
serializable or
don't store it 
in the session.
89
JES-
12
squid
:S222
1
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tEventsServlet.
java
37
cwe, error-
handling, 
security
Catch a list of
specific 
exception 
subtypes 
instead.
JES-
13
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tEventsServlet.
java
25
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "service" 
transient or 
serializable.
JES-
14
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tEventsServlet.
java
39
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block.
JES-
15
squid
:S194
8
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
22
bug, cwe, 
serializati
on
Make "service" 
transient or 
serializable.
JES-
16
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
31
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"parseLong".
JES-
17
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
34
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JES-
18
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
34
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JES-
19
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
36
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JES-
20
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Lis
tInvitationsSer
vlet.java
36
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"forward".
JES-
21
squid
:S198
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Red
irectServlet.ja
va
23
cert, cwe, 
error-
handling, 
owasp-a6, 
security
Add a 
"try/catch" 
block for 
"sendRedirect".
JES-
22
findb
ugs:H
RS_RE
QUEST
_PARA
METER
_TO_H
TTP_H
EADER
MAJOR
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Red
irectServlet.ja
va
23 cwe, owasp-a3
HTTP parameter 
directly 
written to HTTP
header output 
in 
io.vksn.summons
.ui.servlet.Red
irectServlet.do
Get(HttpServlet
Request, 
HttpServletResp
onse)
90
JES-
23
finds
ecbug
s:UNV
ALIDA
TED_R
EDIRE
CT
MAJOR
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
io/vksn/summons
/ui/servlet/Red
irectServlet.ja
va
23
cwe, 
security, 
wasc
Unvalidated 
Redirect
JES-
24
squid
:S336
9
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
WEB-INF/web.xml
cwe, jee, 
owasp-a7, 
security, 
websphere
Add "security-
constraint" 
elements to 
this 
descriptor.
JES-
25
squid
:S335
5
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
ui
WEB-INF/web.xml
injection, 
owasp-a1, 
security
Add a 
validation 
filter to this 
"web.xml".
JES-
26
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
api
io/vksn/summons
/entity/Table.j
ava
83
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Return a copy 
of "chairs".
JES-
27
squid
:S238
4
CRITI
CAL
io.vksn.
summons:
summons-
api
io/vksn/summons
/entity/Table.j
ava
86
cert, cwe, 
security, 
unpredictab
le
Store a copy of
"chairs".
